UIC Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 8

Winter 1986

Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne: The Irrational
Relationship of Mental Retardation to Zoning Objectives, 19 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 469 (1986)
Jeanette M. Bourey

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeanette M. Bourey, Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne: The Irrational Relationship of Mental
Retardation to Zoning Objectives, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 469 (1986)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/8
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CASENOTES

CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER v. CITY OF
CLEBURNE:* THE IRRATIONAL RELATIONSHIP
OF MENTAL RETARDATION TO ZONING
OBJECTIVES
A mentally retarded person's right to treatment in the least restrictive environment has recently assumed constitutional dimensions' and has prompted the use of group homes as normative habilitation settings for mildly to moderately retarded adults? In
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne,' the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the proposed residents of a group
home for the mentally retarded were a sufficiently suspect class to
require intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
* 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
1. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp.
373 (1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); 42
U.S.C. § 6010 (1982) (all developmentally disabled persons entitled to treatment and
habilitation in an environment least restrictive to their civil liberties); 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982) (federally supported programs and activities shall not discriminate against any
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual"); Mentally Retarded Persons Act of
1977, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (establishing
"right to live in the least restrictive habilitation setting appropriate to the individul's needs and to be treated in the least intrusive manner appropriate for the individual's needs").
r 2. Group homes are the principal non-institutional living alternatives for the
mentally retarded. The Fifth Circuit found that the existence of group homes "is
critical to assimilation" into society. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726
F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1984). Contra S. BERcovIci, BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION: THE
RESTRICTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RETARDED PERSONS 8-9 (1982); PRESIDENT'S COMMITrEE
ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1974).
The deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded persons and other dependent
groups has created a need for community residential alternatives that have yet to be
developed. See generally Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based
qroup Homes for the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REv.
69 (1981) (discussion of local resistance that group homes encounter in residential
locations). Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218 (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("[t]o allow
Bibb County to 'zone out' the proposed group home would unquestionably frustrate
the implementation of a clearly articulated state policy"), dismissed for want of a
federal question, 105 S.Ct. 57 (1984). The dissent, in Macon Association, noted that
the group home would be an unobtrusive use because the-outward physical appearance would remain unchanged and the residents would-function as a single housekeeping unit like other families in the neighborhood. Id. at 492, 314 S.E.2d at 225.
3. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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the fourteenth amendment." The Cleburne Court held that classifications based on mental retardation were not quasi-suspect, 5 but
nonetheless concluded that the challenged zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to Cleburne Living Center because it6 violated the mentally retarded residents' equal protection rights.
Cleburne Living Center (the Center) planned to establish a li-

7
censed residential facility for mildly to moderately retarded adults

in a multi-residential district of Cleburne, Texas.' The Cleburne
Planning and Zoning Commission classified the Center as a "hospital for the feeble-minded" and required the Center to apply for a
special use permit.9 Following a public hearing and commission and
4. Id. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XIV

5. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3258. Justice White wrote the majority
opinion in the six to three decision. Although concurring in the result, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun would have found the mentally retarded a quasi-suspect class and, therefore, dissented from the majority's refusal to apply heightened
scrutiny. For a discussion of quasi-suspect classification analysis see infra notes 20,
29.
6. Id. at 3260.
7. Cleburne Living Center is a Texas corporation organized for the purpose of
establishing and operating supervised group homes for the mentally retarded.
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1984).
Cleburne Living Center currently operates a group home in Keene, Texas, which
would serve as a model program. Joint Appendix at 35, Cleburne Living Center v.
City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). Jan Hannah is Vice President and a onethird shareholder of Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. Id. at 4. Hannah purchased the
house at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne with the intention of establishing a
group home for the mentally retarded. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
8. Cleburne zoning ordinance, Section 8, District R-3 Apartment House District, use regulations provide:
In District R-3, no building, structure, land or premises shall be used, and no
building or structure shall be hereafter erected, constructed, reconstructed,
moved or altered, except for one or more of the following uses .
1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged,
other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is carried
on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses and located on
the same lot, not involving the conduct of a business or industry.
10. Signs as provided in sect. 21.
Joint Appendix at 60-61, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3249 (emphasis
added).
9. Cleburne Living Center was advised that a special use permit would be required for the proposed group home because "although a home for 'mentally deficient' persons is not specifically excluded, WEBSTER's NEW IDEAL DICTIONARY defines
the term 'feeble-minded' as 'mentally deficient.'" The Center was then referred to
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council meetings, the city denied the Center's permit request,'0 stating that the proposed location was unsuitable" and that property
owners neighboring the proposed site, fearing that crime and other
aberrant behavior would increase, vehemently opposed its establishment." The Center filed suit against the city in the District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, seeking injunctive relief from the
permit denial and monetary damages for lost profits."
Finding the challenged ordinance rationally related to the city's
legitimate interest in the location of facilities serving the mentally
retarded, the district court affirmed the permit denial." The United
the exclusionary classification of "hospitals for the feeble-minded" under section 16
of the Cleburne zoning ordinance. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3252-53;
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, Letter from Robert Miller, assistant city attorney, to Ms.
Northrup of Cleburne Living Center (September 29, 1980), Joint Appendix at 69,
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
10. On July 28, 1980, the Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission held a
hearing and subsequently denied the Center's special use permit application. On October 14, 1980, following a public hearing, the Cleburne City Council voted three-toone to again deny the Center a special use permit. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d
at 194.
11. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3259. The four bedroom and two bath
house has 2700 square feet of living space and is located on a corner lot measuring
156 by 103 feet. The Texas Department of Health and Human Services had tenatively approved its use as a licensed group home. Joint Appendix at 74, Cleburne
Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984).
12. The Fifth Circuit found the challenged ordinance overbroad because it allowed the city to exclude all group homes based on the vocal opposition of neighboring landowners. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 201. "In effect, prejudice becomes its own excuse." Id. at 202.
13. The original plaintiffs included Cleburne Living Center, Jan Hannah, Johnson County Association for Retarded Citizens (dismissed for lack of standing), and
Advocacy, Inc. (lacked standing to represent the individual claims of Hannah and
Cleburne Living Center but provided legal representation). The defendants included
the Cleburne mayor, whom also acted as chairman of the city council; the three
elected councilmen; and the city attorney who was responsible for the prosecution of
zoning violations. Joint Appendix at 60-61, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at
3249.
The first amended complaint filed January 11, 1982 alleged violations of Title 42
of U.S.C. § 1983, the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and
first amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the right to travel. Id. at
11-12. State claims included violations of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Texas Constitution and statutory violation of the Texas Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977. Id. at 12-13. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the prohibition of operating the group home, monetary losses of rent to
Hannah, lost profits to the Center, and the permanent enjoinment of the city's use of
general revenue sharing funds. Id. at 13-15.
14. The district court applied the lowest level of scrutiny, rational review, and
upheld the ordinance even after finding that the city's action "was motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons who are mentally
retarded." Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3253. Under the first tier of the
equal protection test, all legislative enactments are presumed valid unless a suspect
classification is used or a fundamental right is abridged. See New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 285 (1932) (Brandeis J., dissenting) (State action held valid
unless clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable). Justice Stewart stated: "In the
absence of invidious discrimination, however, a court is not free under the aegis of the
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding
that because mentally retarded persons experienced historical
prejudice, political powerlessness, and immutable disabilities, they
are a quasi-suspect class.'8
Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard of review appropriate to the quasi-suspect finding, the Fifth Circuit held the municipal ordinance facially unconstitutional because its discriminatory
treatment of the mentally retarded failed to further any important
governmental interest."0 The court of appeals further found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied 7 to the Center, based on the
city's lack of justification for treating group homes for the mentally
retarded as a special use.'" The Supreme Court of the United States
granted the city certiorarito determine whether a traditional level
of scrutiny, rational review, should apply to classifications based on
mental retardation and whether the city ordinance was valid under
the appropriate standard of review."
The Court carefully scrutinized the characteristic of mental re20
tardation against the traditional indicia of suspect classifications.
equal protection clause to substitute its judgment for the will of the people of a state
as expressed in the laws passed by their popularly elected legislatures." Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("[ljegislatures have wide discretion in passing laws
that have the inevitable effect of treating some people differently from others").
15. The Fifth Circuit found that these factors, in addition to the effects of segregation, isolation, and exclusion, were sufficient to invoke intermediate scrutiny.
Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 198-99. See also infra note 29.
16. In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court of appeals held the ordinance
unconstitutional on its face. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 200. Assuming that
the stated legislative goals are substantial, in each instance "there is not a sufficiently
close correspondence between the goal and the ordinance's means of achieving it." Id.
In response to the denial of the city's petition for rehearing en banc, six judges
filed a dissenting opinion on the ground that regulatory statutes which treat the mentally retarded differently should not be invalidated under a heightened scrutiny analysis when no fundamental rights are at stake and the classification has a rational
basis. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
17. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit finding that the mentally retarded were denied equal protection of the laws not because of the language of the
ordinance but because of its application to residential facilities for the mentally retarded. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. at 3259. See also Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discusses majority development of novel
"as applied" standard).
18. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 200-01. The Cleburne zoning ordinance
discriminates between persons having mild to moderate mental retardation and other
groups, such as the elderly, that require supervision but are permitted to establish
group homes in the apartment-zoned district without a special use permit. Id. at 201.
See infra note 60; see also Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. and Planning Bd.,
71 N.J. 230, 238, 364 A.2d 1005, 1013 (1976) (ordinances which regulate use by regulating the identified user are valid so long as the classifications are reasonably drawn
and the conditions they impose bear a real and substantial relationship to regulation
of land use).

19. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. 427 (1984).
20. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
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Finding insufficient suspect indicia in the classification, and noting
the social and economic nature of the legislation, the Cleburne
Court allowed the city broad regulatory latitude.2 1 In support of its
holding that only minimal scrutiny was warranted, the Court found
the Center's equal protection claim analogous to the age based classification asserted in Massachusett's Board of Retirement v.
Murgia.2 The Court reasoned that rational review was appropriate
because a classification based on mental retardation, like that based
on age, related to individual ability.238 Using this lower level of scrutiny, the Court held the city's classification of the Center as a "hospital for the feeble-minded" constitutional24 and focused on how the
challenged ordinance's special use permit was then applied. 5
The Court determined that although the city had a legitimate
interest in the location of special uses within its borders, the city
could not apply the special use ordinance based on concerns which
were irrelevant to the classification.2 6 The ordinance's special use
permit provision denied the Center equal protection of the laws because similarly situated multi-family and care residences were not
(prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition" calling
for severe scrutiny). See also W. COHEN & J. KAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

774-75 (2d ed. 1982).

21. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-56. The Court found a legitimate governmental interest in providing for the distinctive needs and capabilities of
the mentally retarded. Relying on United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980), and New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), the Cleburne Court granted
the city "wide latitude" in legislating for social and economic purposes. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
22. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). But see
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3269 n.19 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (majority reliance on Murgia is misplaced because it predates intermediate scrutiny and only stands for the proposition that age based classifications
do not warrant strict scrutiny).
23. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
24. Id. at 3255-58.
25. Id. at 3258-60. The Court required the city to show "any rational basis" for
its belief that the group home would impact differently on legitimate interests than
would other multi-family and care residences. Id. at 3259.
26. Each of the reasons which the city asserted to justify denying the Center's
permit application violated equal protection of the laws. The prejudice of neighboring
property owners, "unsubstantiated by factors" relevant to a zoning procedure, was
found impermissible as were the generalized concerns of legal liability and the loca-

tion on a 500-year flood plain near a school. Id. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 118-19 (1976) (mental retardation is just one
category of handicap included in the legislative classification of "developmentally disabled" used to denote groups with similar problems). See also ISSUES IN COMMUNITY
RESIDENTIAL CARE 79-80 (R. Budson ed. 1981) (recent legal challenge against exclusionary zoning practices have made it clear that land use regulations, naively believed
to be concerned with purely physical aspects of community development, have significant social impacts that have been overlooked too long). Cf. Note, The Suspect Context: A New Suspect Classification Doctrine for the Mentally Handicapped,26 ARiz.
L. REV. 205 (1984) (advocating that heightened judicial scrutiny be applied to mental
retardation classifications only in the context of zoning).
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subject to this permit requirement and could locate as of right anywhere within that zoned district.27 Finding that the application of
the special use permit provision to the Center denied its mentally
retarded residents equal protection, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the ordinance was facially invalid. 9
The Cleburne Court then engaged in an apparently heightened
scrutiny"9 of the classification and advanced four reasons for reversing the Fifth Circuit's holding that mentally retarded persons are a
quasi-suspect class. 0 First, classifications that govern as large and
diverse a group as the mentally retarded require substantive social
and economic policy decisions best suited to the legislature, not the
judiciary.3 1 Second, special legislation for the mentally retarded at
both the state and federal levels weighs against the need for extra
judicial scrutiny.82 Third, the special legislative response to the
unique needs of the mentally retarded contradicts the Fifth Circuit's
finding that the group is politically powerless.38 Fourth, granting in27. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
28. Id. at 3258 (Court did not address issue of whether the city "may never
insist on a special use permit" for a mentally retarded group residence).
29. The Supreme Court has developed an intermediate tier in its equal protection analysis to provide greater judicial protection from the denial of very important
benefits to certain quasi-suspect classes. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(Texas statute authorizing public schools to deny enrollment to children of illegal
aliens found unconstitutional under a heightened standard of review). See generally
Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of DiscriminatoryIntent: A New Model, 90
YALE L.J. 912 (1981). But see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) ("the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process"); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 710 (3d Cir. 1979) (without judicial
recognition of suspectness, large budget allocations for treatment of mentally ill "are
warnings against judicial creation of a new suspect classification").
30. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3255-58.
31. Id. at 3256. The Cleburne Court used intermediate scrutiny even though it
claimed to have used minimal scrutiny. Id. at 3264-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The Court's deference to the legislature because of "perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary" is ironic because the record clearly shows
that the city officials lacked professional guidance in their classification and treatment of the potential group home residents. Councilman Bass admitted not knowing
what mental retardation was and Councilman Johns stated he had never met a retarded person even though he was formerly on the board of directors of a local sheltered workshop. Joint Appendix at 24-31, Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne,
726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984). Mr. Johns characterized the mentally retarded as "mentally unbalanced." Id. at 26-27.
32. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3256. See also supra note 1.
33. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3257. The developmentally disabled,
as a diverse handicapped population, have in recent years gained important statutory
rights which courts have enforced against local interests. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL

REPORT 155 (1976). Courts have entered declaratory

judgments on behalf of the mentally retarded regarding the right to appropriate education, the right to treatment, the right to due process, the right to employment and
minimum wages, the right to access to public transportation, the right to reside in the
community, and the right to treatment and habilitation services in the community.
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termediate scrutiny to a group as amorphous as the mentally retarded opens the flood gates to a myriad of heretofore unrecognized
claims of the aged, physically disabled, and mentally ill. 4
The Court was correct in finding that the mentally retarded do
not constitute a quasi-suspect class because mental retardation is a
mutable classification based on intelligence tests and social adaptation skills.3 5 Both the status and degree of an individual's retardation are often uncertain because interpretations of scores vary
widely and intelligence and social adaptation are dynamic."6 The
Court, however, did not go far enough in striking down the application of the zoning ordinance. Rather, the Court should have facially
invalidated the ordinance, under a rational review standard, because
of the city's impermissible exercise of its police power.
The standardized test scores underlying the label of mental retardation, although subject to variable interpretation, are objective
indicators of individual ability.3 7 Because there is a relationship between the individual's degree of retardation and his actual ability to
function in society,38 state and federal legislatures have enacted
statutes to enhance societal accomodation of the mentally retarded
person's intellect and coping skills. 9 The Court generally has upheld
legislative classifications against equal protection claims under a rational relation level of scrutiny where the classifications legitimately
"In sum, the right to be different and to have that difference accomodated." Id. Cf.
W. COHEN & J. KAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
775 (2d ed. 1982).
34. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
35. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Roos, testified at trial that the status of mental
retardation is determined by the composite result of three different kinds of tests:
"[e]ssentially mental retardation is a problem of learning .... There is a wide variability among retarded individuals [as to degree of retardation]. . . .We use basically
three criteria [to determine whether an individual is retarded]: Measured intelligence,
adaptive behavior and medical classification." Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at
192 n.1.
36. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 32
(1974). Approximately six million persons are labeled mentally retarded in the United
States. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1976).
Ninety-five percent of all mentally retarded persons are only mildly to moderately
impaired and are candidates for total assimilation into society. Id.
37. One commentator has noted that some suspect classifications are mutable,
for example, alienage, and some immutable characteristics such as physical disability
and intelligence are legitimate classifications. Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof
of DiscriminatoryIntent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981).
38. See infra note 42.
39. The mentally retarded do not require extra judicial protection: "[tihe bulwark of constitutional protection for mentally retarded persons, therefore, lies in the
enforcement of their substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. . . .Accordingly, a determination that heightened scrutiny does not apply would simply represent a sound interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, not an abdication of
judicial majoritarian excess." Amicus Brief for the United States at 20, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3249.
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reflect individual ability. 40
The Supreme Court's refusal to apply intermediate scrutiny was
proper because the mentally retarded are insufficiently suspect."'
Mental retardation, as a defining characteristic, is mutable and rationally related to actual ability. 42 The suspect class analysis was un-

necessary, however, because the zoning ordinance on its face would
not have passed the Cleburne Court's rational relation standard of
40. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (unsuccessful challenge to
statutory termination of welfare benefits to institutionalized persons under age sixty-

five). The Court sustained the challenged statute without determining whether the
mentally ill plaintiffs were a suspect class. Id. at 234. In dissent, Justice Powell found
the classification irrational under the rational relation test. Id. at 241 n.2 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Accord Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Pennsylvania Ass'n Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279, 302-03 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(court enforced a consent agreement in which the defendant school district agreed to
protect the right of mentally retarded children to free public education appropriate to
their needs). The rational relation test was applied to sustain governmental hiring
practices which preferentially discriminated against mentally retarded applicants.
Fowler v. U.S., 633 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1979). The same test was used to invalidate differential classifications for employment benefits once a retarded individual
was placed in a job. Id. See also North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. State
of N.C., 420 F. Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (statute providing mandatory sterilization of sexually active mentally retarded citizens upheld under rational relation
standard of review).
Mental illness classifications have similarly been reviewed under the rational relation test. See Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), vacated on different
grounds, 463 U.S. 1222 (1982); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1980),
vacated on different grounds, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 710711 (3d Cir. 1979); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1051-52 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
Similarly, old age has been consistently held not to constitute a suspect classification
because of its relationship to declining abilities. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (the elderly have not been subject to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics "not truly indicative of their
abilities"); Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977).
Discrimination on the basis of intelligence is not suspect because it is not directed at a discrete and insular minority. Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence
Classifications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 647, 655 (1974).
41. The issue of whether persons having mental retardation are suspect was one
of first impression for an appellate court. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 196.
Courts have denied extraordinary protection to the mentally retarded, as well as
other developmentally disabled groups, because of the rational relation that could
exist between their diminished abilities and the objective of the legislation. Amicus
Brief for the United States at 10, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3249 ("[mlore
is needed to justify heightened scrutiny, and that something extra is the absence of
significant differentiating needs and capabilities"). The only other court to apply intermediate scrutiny to a classification based on mental retardation was reversed by
the Supreme Court without reaching the issue of suspectness. Sterling v. Harris, 542
F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
But cf. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982)
(intermediate scrutiny necessary because of continuing discrimination against mentally retarded).
42. See supra note 41. Cf. Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(even though the court found that the blind were a politically weak minority with a
history of prejudice and discrimination, the legitimate relationship of the classification to differential abilities undermined any suspectness).
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review. 4 3 The statute facially discriminated against mentally retarded persons, violating their equal protection rights. Because it

limited relief to the facts of the case, the Court's "as applied" analysis neither clarifies equal protection standards of review nor protects
4
identically situated claimants from future discrimination.
It is apparent, however, that the Cleburne Court applied a more
stringent rational relation test than is traditionally applied to zoning
challenges. 45 The Court could have upheld the city ordinance under
an even more deferential standard of review because the fourteenth

amendment does not proscribe all which confers social and economic
legislation 6 benefits or burdens.'7 Rather than give deference to any
fanciful relation between the classification and a legitimate legislative purpose, the Court demanded that the City prove an actual leg48
islative objective.
Fourteenth amendment standards require that Cleburne officials enact and administer zoning laws in a manner rationally related to the grant of state police power. 49 State action that isolates a
43. Texas courts have yet to construe the Texas statute establishing the right to
treatment in conjunction with zoning powers. The Center voluntarily dismissed the
pendent state claims after a judicial order was issued stating the intent of the trial
judge to resolve the case solely on those grounds. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct.
at 3257 n.11.
44. Id. at 3272-73 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Three of the justices viewed the scrutiny level as a heightened or "second
order" rational basis review. Id. at 3264. See supra note 31. Justice Stevens, in a
separate concurring opinion, viewed the equal protection analysis as another example
of a "single standard" continuum in which the interests of the disadvantaged class
are weighed against the intended public purpose in determining whether the disparate treatment is justified. Id. at 3261-62 n.4.
46. It is the long-standing policy of the Supreme Court to avoid deciding constitutional issues where other grounds are available for resolution of the case. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 307 (1980). See also Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3263
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("permissible discriminations
between persons must bear a rational relation to their relevant characteristics"). Cf.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state classification of optometrists
upheld under traditional rational relation test).
47. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
48. Id. at 3264-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing
numerous competing considerations, courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their
legislation, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality). Ascertaining actual legislative purpose is "an essential step in equal protection" clause analysis. See
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting); F. S. Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 46 (1972) (requiring the legislature to state its own reasons for classifications as the means to a particular objective will encourage a fuller airing in the political arena of the grounds for
legislative action). The goal of group home residences is to assimilate the mentally
retarded into society.
49. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
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person in a manner not in keeping with "a just and proper relation
to the attempted classification" is proscribed."0 Even under a deferential standard of review, ordinances which expressly prohibit particular residential land uses, while permitting other like uses, are irrational and exclusionary."1 The Cleburne Court properly found that
the city's zoning practice of classifying residential facilities for socially undesirable groups in a manner unrelated to the achievement
of any legitimate governmental interest is violative of the fourteenth
amendment. 52
Regardless of the suspect nature of a classification, any legislation conferring a burden should be narrowly drawn, reasonable, and
rest upon "some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relationship to the object of legislation."5 The Cleburne Court carefully scrutinized the city's purported reasons for denying the Center
the right to locate its group home without a special use permit and
50. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897).
51. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (stricter scrutiny necessary "because the article, although within the prohibited class, is so different from others of the class as to be without the reason for the prohibition"). State
courts, although using more restrictive standards for rational review than federal
courts, have found impermissible exclusions in factual circumstances analogous to
those in Cleburne, Texas. See, e.g., People of Cahokia v. Wright, 11 Ill. App. 3d 124,
131, 296 N.E.2d 30, 34 (1973), aff'd, 57 Ill. 2d 166, 311 N.E.2d 153 (1974) (in determining whether a zoning classification violates the equal protection clause, it is fundamental that "there [be] a reasonable basis for differentiating between the class to
which the law is applicable and the class to which it is not"). PDM Construction v.
Welsh, 89 N.J. Super. 460, 461, 215 A.2d 382, 383, aff'd, 91 N.J. Super. 125, 219 A.2d
343 (1966) (court defined nursing home as "nothing more than a boarding house or
hotel for elderly disabled persons" when the zoning ordinance prohibited the former
use and permitted as of right the latter two uses).
When the effect of an ordinance's application to a particular land use is to exclude it, courts will look for a legitimate governmental objective for excluding the
activity. See Berenson v. New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979) (zoning
ordinance could be invalidated on due process grounds if enacted for improper purpose, or if enacted without regard to regional and local housing needs and if it had an
exclusionary effect). Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239
(1975) (when an individual challenging a zoning ordinance proves a total prohibition
of an otherwise lawful use, the burden shifts to the municipality to prove that such
prohibition bears a relationship to public health, safety, morals, and general welfare);
Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group Homes for the
Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV., 669, 680-81 (1981).
52. The State of Texas, in support of the Center, contended that the ordinance
was invalid under the rational relation test because the discriminatory distinction
that ordinance created between group homes for the mentally retarded and multipleoccupant residential facilities for nonretarded persons, including facilities for other
special needs populations, does not rationally advance any valid governmental objective. Amicus Brief for State of Texas at 13-15, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at
3249. See P. Roos, B. MCCANN, AND M. ADDISON, SHAPING THE FUTURE: COMMUNITYBASED

RESIDENTIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE
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(1980) (even though the classification of mental retardation is suspect in some contexts, "there is no need to make that showing [because t]he classifications are without
rational basis").
53. F. S. Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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found each reason insufficiently related to legitimate interests." The
Court concluded that the Center's proposed use of the apartmentzoned land was no different than other residential uses permitted as
of right. 5 The Cleburne Court focused on the narrow application of
the city's classification in finding that it did not further any legitimate zoning objective.5 6
The Cleburne ordinance excluded facilities of any kind for the
mentally retarded, including the Center's group home, unless they
were granted a special use permit.5 7 Classifying residential land uses
according to the mental ability of its occupants is insubstantially
related to the general welfare as required under the exercise of police power.58 Because the legitimate focus of zoning regulations is on
the purpose and use of the property rather than the learning skills
and familial relationships of the users, the city impermissibly used
its police power to exclude the Center's group home."9 After this im54. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3259-60.
55. Although the Court refused to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasisuspect class, it clearly stated that the mental retardation of potential residents was
not a legitimate zoning concern. Id. at 3258. ("(T]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational").
56. Id. at 3259.
57. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 200. No other facilities existed to serve
the mentally retarded in Cleburne. Joint Appendix at 94, Cleburne Living Center,
105 S. Ct. at 3249. The same number of unrelated occupants would have been permitted to reside as of right at the same location if the use was not zoned out of Cleburne
entirely as a "hospital for the feeble-minded." Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at
200. "Because the Featherston house is located in a R-3 zone and, more generally,
because it is located anywhere within Cleburne, its use as a group home is not automatically permitted but requires a special use permit from the Cleburne City Council." Id. at 194. The councilmen's preferred location for the group home was in a
structure the state regulatory authorities found inappropriate. Joint Appendix at 4648, Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. at 3249. "The authority and responsibility to
determine how the unique service needs of the mentally retarded affect their need
and ability to live in community-based group homes is expressly granted to Amicus
Texas Department for the Mentally Handicapped and Mentally Retarded and not to
local zoning authorities." Amicus Brief for The State of Texas and The Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation at 4, Cleburne Living Center,
105 S. Ct. at 3249.
58. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 302 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("means of regulation selected shall have a real or substantial relation to the
object sought to be obtained"). See

G. GUNTHER,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-

683 (9th ed. 1975) (rational review "with a bite" is less strict and, therefore, preferrable to the new three-tier doctrine, in that it "would have the court take
seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that
legislative means substantially further legislative ends).
59. The Cleburne City Council's paternalistic concerns for the safety and wellTIONAL LAw

being of the Center's occupants was not a legitimate special use condition:
ZONING ORDINANCE OF CLEBURNE TEXAS

SECTION 16 SPECIAL USE PERMITS

Any of the following uses may be located in any district by Special Use Permit
of the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of the

Planning Commission, under such conditions as to operation, site development, parking signs, and time limit as may be deemed necessary in order that
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permissible exclusion from locating in Cleburne as of right,60 the city
then declined the Center a special use permit on grounds unrelated
to legitimate zoning objectives."1
The city claimed to have rejected the Center's special use permit application based on potential overcrowding in the group home,
negative perceptions of mentally retarded persons, and concern for
the safety of the Center's residents.6 2 The city council, however, desuch use will not seriously injure the appropriate use of neighboring property,
and will conform to the general intent and purpose of this Ordinance ....
To
better facilitate supervision of the special use permits, a limitation of one year
is applicable to each such permit issued.
Each applicant shall be required to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used for the following
purposes under the special use permits: 9. Hospital for the insane or feeble
minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions.
Joint Appendix at 62-63, Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 191. See Comment,
Can the Mentally Retarded Enjoy "Yards That are Wide?," 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1349,
1377 (1982).
60. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 200-02. Texas Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1965, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5547-202 217(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1985); Texas Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, TEx.REv.Cv.STAT.ANN.
art. 5547-300 58-60 (Vernon Supp. 1985). See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle,
455 U.S. 283, 291-95 (1982) (a municipality may not prohibit an activity that state
sanctions); Leslz v. Kavanaugh, (E.D. Tex. July 19, 1983) (unpublished order and
memorandum opinion) (the State and the Texas Department for the Mentally Handicapped and Mentally Retarded agreed to identify and overcome legal, programmatic,
financial and attitudinal barriers to the creation of facilities and programs for habilitation outside of institutions), cited with approval in Amicus Brief for The State of
Texas and The Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation at 10,
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). "The exercise of
local zoning powers to exclude such privately operated (but state regulated and
jointly state and federally financed) group homes from normal residential neighborhoods frustrates state public policy." Id. at 3.
Impermissible uses of police powers against suspect classes are found in exclusionary zoning practices. For example, in racial and economic discrimination cases a
court has found proof of discriminatory intent in the administration of regulations
and local zoning histories sufficient to invalidate the application of the ordinance
under the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Hope, Inc. v.
County of DuPage, Ill., 717 F. 2d 1061, 1076 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[d]istinctions and differentiation among citizens based upon their racial or economic compatibility cannot
be a legitimate government interest under the equal protection clause"). Accord Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Kropf v. Sterling Heights, 391 Mich.
139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
61. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
62. The factors the city council listed in reaching its decision to deny the special use permit included:
(a) the attitude of a majority of owners of property located within two hundred
(200) feet of 210 [sic] Featherston;
(b) the location of a junior high across the street from 201 Featherston;
(c) concern for the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood;
(d) the size of the home and the number of people to be housed;
(e) concern over the legal responsibility of CLC for any actions which the mentally retarded residents might take;
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nied the permit because it was ignorant and unjustifiably fearful of
mildly to moderately retarded persons. 3 In allowing neighboring
landowners to control the issuance of special use permits, the city
council impermissibly delegated its police power to a vocal majority. 4 The Court concluded that none of these factors were related to
legitimate zoning objectives, s but allowed the city to retain the
challenged classification in its ordinance.6 "
The Supreme Court's decision, however, will negatively affect
the access of group homes to residential communities because it affirmed the use of discriminatory classifications in municipal ordinances to exclude socially undesirable residents. The Supreme Court
should have facially invalidated the entire ordinance based on the
City of Cleburne's impermissible use of police power to classify residential uses without an actual relation to any legitimate governmental interest. In focusing on the city's application of the permit provision to the Center, the Court failed to vindicate the right of
(f) the home's location on a five hundred (500) year flood plain; and
(g) in general, the presentation made before the City Council.
Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 202. See Okolo and Guskin, Community Attitudes Toward Community Placement of Mentally Retarded Persons, 12 INT'L REV.
OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 25 (1984) (the prevalent fears of increased
crime, sexual deviance, and decreased property values neighbors experienced in most
communities have proven unfounded). Accord Society of Good Will to Retarded
Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1340 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds,
737 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1983).
63. The city council's vote on October 14, 1980, as well as the city planning and
zoning commission's earlier vote on August 18, 1980, to deny a special use permit for
the Featherston street group home "was motivated primarily by the fact that the
residents of the home would be persons who are mentally retarded." Cleburne Living
Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3253. "In effect, prejudice and fear becomes its own excuse."
Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 202. Cf. Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1982), modified, 718 F.2d 22 (1983) (en banc) (neighbors formed partnership
to defeat state's acquisition of a single-family dwelling for use as a group home); East
House Corp. v. Riker, 72 Misc. 2d 823, 339 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1973) (opposition to express
intent of ordinance to permit group homes for the "mentally restored"); Gage v.
Plymouth Woods Corp., 402 Pa. 244, 167 A.2d 292 (1961) (neighbors lost suit to enjoin operation of nursing home because they could not prove any disruption of quiet
enjoyment or traffic hazards); Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (N.H. 1981) (adjoining property owners sued director of State Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals alleging fifth and fourteenth amendment violations for locating
a group home in their neighborhood). For a critical analysis of community acceptance
of group homes for the mentally retarded, see Boyd, Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangment for Retarded Citizens: Parens Patriae Meets Police
Power, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1981); Comment, Zoning and Community Group Homes
for the Mentally Retarded - Boon or Bust?, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 64 (1980).
64. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 200. See Washington v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928) (denial of a special use permit for a philanthropic nursing home in a
residential district violated the fourteenth amendment when it was based solely on
the lack of consent of adjoining property owners).
65. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at 3253, 3260.
66. Id. at 3258, 3274.
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similarly situated group homes to locate in residential communities
across the country.
Jeanette M. Bourey

